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ABSTRACT
The federal-state system of welfare is the result of a compromise between
the desire for national standards and the opportunity for each state to have its
own adaptation. As a compromise, there is a constant tension in the system.
During the 1970's, there was a pressure toward federalization, but the states have
preserved their diversity. The Reagan Administration has clearly indicated a
desire to "return" greater freedom to the states to chart their own course. The
purpose of this paper is to identify variations among the states in such a way as
to identify those states with consistently "high" or consistently "low" expendi-
tures for welfare after allowance is made for differences in need, capacity, and
chance variations. Individual states deviations from expected expenditures are
noted over the past decade. The resilience of the states in pursuit of their own
welfare paths is noted and the implication of this for tension in federal-state
relationship is shown.
The changing relationships between the national government and the state
governments have been a significant element in shaping the debate about welfare
in this nation for the last twenty years. The perception that one set of govern-
ments or another would be likely fiscal losers in any reshaping of welfare has
stood as an impediment to reform. At the same time, the absence of a clear cut
consensus of where power, capacity and responsibility lay in the coordinate system
has fueled a significant portion of the welfare debate. The debate about welfare
responsibility between those concerned with national standards and those concerned
with the opportunity for state adaptations would, no doubt, have taken place even
in the absence of legalistic and fiscal problems. The federal systems demand for
dual responsibility along side very uneven fiscal capacities for state programs
has magnified the already difficult problem of selecting and implementing welfare
policy. (1)
In recent years voices from virtually all points on the political spectrum
have called for a reassessment of the federal-state responsibilities in AFDC, Food
Stamps, and Medicaid programs. The goals of these reassessments are clearly not
the same for all of the interested parties. The goals of the various reform
proposals involved modification of welfare itself as well as changes in federal/
state responsibilities for welfare policy. The goals most frequently articulated
are these:
(1) a desire to eliminate (or at least reduce) inter-state differences in
benefit schedules
(2) to increase the benefits of lower paying states
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(3) to achieve a better balance between fiscal demands of welfare programs
with fiscal capacity to meet the need
(4) to reduce the aggregate spending on these transfer programs (or at least
to reduce the rate at which these programs grow)
(5) to more effectively target benefits to those in the greatest need
(6) to shift fiscal responsibility from one level of government to another
(7) to sort out the federal/state responsibilities to achieve a higher
level of policical accountability and fiscal responsibility
Particular plans for reform reflect different priorities among these goals. It
is also clear that some of these goals are incompatible with one another. Each
president since John Kennedy has provided some measure of leadership in a welfare
reform effort, but each presidential initiative has been defeated because of
internal beauracratic and legislative inability to forge a compromise among these
goals. The most recent initiative has been President Reagan's proposal for a
swap of welfare responsibilities.
Behind each new proposal for welfare reform there lies a complex tangle of
political desires and deeply held convictions about both welfare itself and the
federal/state responsibilities involved in the delivery of welfare services. Any
welfare proposal must address simultaniously a theory of povery and a theory of
inter-governmental relations. The first issue is reasonably well addressed in the
literature. If one believes that the low income condition is a function of in-
sufficient employment opportunities of low skilled workers, then a jobs and skills
enhancement strategy needs to be given priority. If one beleives that the problem
lies with specific character and motivational problems of low income persons,
then social work services need to be emphasized. If one believes that inequality
is a systemic consequence of capitalism, then a negative income tax and direct
re-distributional schemes need to be emphasized. (Sommers, 1982) At the pragmatic
political level the proposals usually contain a complex misture of such goals.
Two decades of poverty research reflect the diversity of poverty theories and the
resulting differences of grand strategies of welfare reform. Relatively less
attention has been paid to the question of inter-governmental relations.
Questions of the appropriate relationship between the central and state
governments are of obvious fiscal and political importance. The fact that one or
another set of governments perceive of themselves as fiscal losers in a re-
shuffled set or responsibilities clearly affects the course of reform within Con-
gress and the state capitols. A complete history of the welfare reform effort
needs to include the details of the various cost-estimating techniques used by the
administration, the Congressional Budget Office and the various state welfare
establishments. During the Carter welfare reform effort the administration
originally estimated that the new program would cost an additional 2.6 billion
dollars, but the CBO estimated the federal cost at 25 billion dollars. Haskins,
1981 During the Reagan administration's effort the Office of Management and
Budget estimated a net savings to the state of 2.6 billion dollars, but the
Congressional Budget Office estimated a 4.4 billion dollar state loss.( U.S.G.A.0.,
1982 ) The lack of confidence in cost estimations is only one of the problems
associated with disentangling federal/state responsibilities.
A second, equally difficult problem is the impact of dual federalism on
interstate diversity in benefits, which appear intractable in the face of incre-
mental reform. The present set of programs, of AFDC, Food Stamps and Medicare
interact with one another in curious and unintended ways. The net effect of
increasing AFDC benefit is to reduce food stamp benefit to the household by 30
cents for each dollar of benefit increase. Increase in AFDC benefits also ex-
pand Medicaid eligibility. The resulting consequences impacts on the state
budgets in ways that are difficult to predict. During the 1970's there was a
considerable political effort to decrease diverisity in benefits. One of the
intents of the food stamp program was to reduce the inter-state diversity in
total benefits to households elegible for both programs. Despite some progress,
the states have acted in such ways as to retain considerable diversity. This
is shown in Table I.
TABLE I
Diversity in AFDC Benefits
And AFDC/Food Stamp
Benefits, 1970-1980.
(State Maximum Payment To A Family Of Four With No Other Income)
1970 1980 1980
AFDC Schedules AFDC Schedules AFDC with Food Stamps
Range 3756-828 6828-1680 7549-3990
Mean 2413 4218 5829
Standard Deviation 800 1532 1010
Co-efficient of Variation .311 .363 .173
The Reagan Administration has made it abundantly clear that it will seek
to place emphasis on state responsibility and control. Thomas, 1981 Along the
federal political fault line, the pressure will now come from the opposite
direction. In light of this new emphasis of an old conflict in the federal/
state contest, it is instructive to examine the differential performance among
the states.
During the last eight years, despite significant political pressures for
federalization of AFDC, the proportion of federal dollars spent on AFDC has been
remarkably stable as is shown in Table II. The change in federal participation
is a function of the changes in the Food Stamp Program.
TABLE II
Inter-Governmental Expenditures
For AFDC & Food Stamps
1970 - 80
A F D C AFDC
Federal Federal Total
STATE FEDERAL Proportion Food Stamp Federal
(millions $) (millions $) (millions $) Proportion
1970 2,234 2,623 54.0 551 58.7
1973 3,426 4,153 54.8 2,136 64.7
1978 5,507 6,332 53.5 5,165 67.6
1980 5,914 6,838 -179- 53.6 9,210 73.1
Table II shows that while federal expenditures have exploded, so too have
state expenditures in the aggregate. What has not been equally noted is that
the expansion in the states has been decidely uneven. Some states have signi-
ficantly increased their benefit schedules, coverage and hence expenditures on
AFDC programs, while other have declined in real dollar terms. In light of the
lack of progress toward comparible programs after a period of federalization and
now the apparent desire of some actors "to return" these programs to the states,
it is instructive to provide a closer examination of the states different roles
in funding their parts of welfare programs. These funding patterns as measured
by per capita expenditures from their own funds have remained diverse. After
a decade of federal pressures, AFDC remains a collection of varied state plans
in part funded by federal dollars. See Table III.
The differences noted above reflect real differences in the socio-economic
conditions and political pressures in the various states. Because the states
have different traditions and resources in their spending on welfare programs
the result is variations in benefits paid from one state to the next.
One of the questions extensively discussed in the political science
literature has been the extent to which political structures, political processes,
socio-economic needs, and/or economic resources are influential in "explaining"
state welfare performances. (2)
In the field of public finance, there has been voluminous empirical
literature dealing with the budetary impacts of inter-governmental grants. These
studies have typically found strong and significant coefficients for the grants.
One of the best of these studies, that of Larry Orr, finds that the grants to
the state are varied inversly to per capita income and range from 50% to 78% of
state dollars. Orr's research indicates that there is slippage in the grants,
and that about one-third of the grant is used to increase benefits and the rest
is released for other budgetary purposes and/or tax relief. (Orr, 1976)
The question posed in this paper is different. We are interested in
identification of the states with unusually high and unusually low expenditures
after allowance is made for differences in need and capacity, and for chance
variations made. In light of current circumstances,there is every evidence that
states will need to assume a much greater responsibility for the funding of social
programs. A careful examination of expenditure dollars in the past psovides the
best clue to state spending in the immediate future.
Methodology
Like the previous studies, which attempted to identify the determinants of
public spending, our basic statistical tool is regression analysis. Unlike past
studies, however, we are not developing a causal model. Rather we are building
on the causal models currently available in the literature. We have developed
this investigation based on a procedure developed by Robert Klitgaard and George
R. Hall. We are using the information learned from causal models to judge unique
state performance. (Mosteller, 1977)
1. Instead of concentrating on property of the regression line, the per-
centage of variaticn ecplained (R2 )and the coefficients of the regressor
variables, attention is devoted to the residuals from the regression
line.
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TABLE III
State Expenditures Per/Capita
From Their Own Sources On
1972-1980 (In Constant 1980 Dollars)5
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Conneticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indianna
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisianna
Maine
Maryland
Massachusets
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakato
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
S. Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
W. Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Mean
Standard
Deviation
1974 1976 1978
118 128 129
201 184 228
67 66 66
132 148 159
316 308 337
172 169 174
164 189 209
139 84 178
84 84 78
149 142 142
226 266 297
122 130 127
232 238 246
102 117 121
105 173 178
127 158 162
127 173 170
142 153 154
202 206 237
175 179 183
331 300 314
264 300 285
224 263 280
140 128 156
118 127 130
123 125 144
119 121 136
117 122 121
151 179 173
201 217 228
132 119 118
356 404 374
100 109 108
95 112 130
149 174 187
177 176 178
145 129 224
217 248 307
271 301 314
85 105 123
118 145 148
110 131 140
112 125 116
110 131 152
215 248 217
122 131 143
182 125 188
105 135 139
209 248 269
84 85 89
159 174 168
64 66 69 66
1980 1980+1970
141 .965
288 1.391
68 .839
141 .993
286 .771
139 .735
212 1.197
165 1.012
78 .821
142 .768
240 1.086
123 1.098
223 1.360
121 1.222
189 1.549
158 1.596
177 1.301
154 .945
235 1.298
179 1.065
314 .966
292 1.242
254 1.329
156 .951
134 .971
137 1.123
122 1.103
96 .814
182 1.300
208 1.078
128 .865
358 1.003
131 1.191
140 1.186
169 1.300
181 .790
181 1.351
236 1.249
145 1.221
116 1.590
152 1.288
130 1.102
105 .833
129 1.040
187 .813
144 1.310
191 1.067
130 1.101
261 1.591
91 1.071
176 1.170
67 .228
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2. Instead of including an abundance of regressor variables to explain
as much variation as possible, we are diliberately attempting to avoid
over-controlling.
3. The critical intent is to "understand" the residuals.
Residual variation can arise from many causes: imperfections in measurement,
misspecification of variables, omitted variables, incomplete and/or inaccurate data,
as well as poor choice of fitting techniques. Our goal is to separate non-random
outlyers from random variations.
The basic null hypothesis of this investigation is that there are no unusually
effective (or ineffective) states. The assumption is then, when one has a well
specified model with properly measured variables, deviations from the regression
line are essentially random.
In order to gain a perspective of the randomness of the error terms we observe
the standardized residuals. This formula is:
obse ed - esti ted 1
Standardised = spenaYng spenang
Standard error fo the the
estimate
ifrom regression model
The basic model estimates state welfare spending by controlling for variations
in per capita income, percent high school graduates, percent non-white, and percent
urban. Typically, these variables explain about one quarter of the interstate
variations. The addition of politcal variables to this model does not significantly
alter the estimates of welfare performance. This result is consistent with previous
studies using step-wise regression models to estimate spending on welfare. (Stonecash,
1981) See Table IV. The basic intent here involves looking at a series of distri-
butions of residuals over time. States which consistently score some distance above
or below their expected performance provides fairly strong evidence that that state
has an unusual pattern of determining its committment to welfare. See Table V.
The null hypothesis is that all states have their welfare spending similarly
determined and that all of the variations in a particular distribution are the
results of chance. Then, by using the nominal theorem and assuming independence,
we compute the theoretical frequency of distribution of the number of times a state
would have a spending deviation greater than one standard residual or less than one
standard residual. This is contrasted with the observed occurences in Table VI.
A remarkedly consistend patter of deviation occurs which is decidely non-
random. No state, for example, deviates both above and below its expected levels.
While 25 states deviated at least once, 8 of these deviated all 5 times. This is
consistent with the notion that circumstances which impel a state to unusual per-
formance levels are stable. Clearly, if one knew what that cirsumstance was, the
search would conclude. One could suggest that welfare performance is highly determin-
ed and the residuals would disappear. The point is, we do not know what they are.
The states identified by this procedure are each different in some unknown ways.
There is thus a strong persumptive evidence that welfare spending is vital, not
deterministic. Close inquiry -- perhaps by case studies -- is likely to give
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TABLE IV
Regression Estimates of AFDC: 1972-80
Dependent Variable: Per Capita Spending From
Own Sources on AFDC
1980
Independent Variables Beta t
Per Capita Income 80 .2430 1.55
Percent Metro 80 .3120 2.09 r 2  .2444
Percent Non-White 80 -.0297 .74
Percent H.S. Grads. 80 -.1167 .21
1978
Independent Variables Beta t
Per Capita Income 78 .2613 1.46
Percent Metro 77 .3434 2.32 r 
2
= .2277
Percent Non-White 70 -.0945 .63
Percent H.S. Grads. 76 -.0947 .52
1976
Independent Variables Beta t
Per Capita Income 76 .3146 1.83
Percent Metro 76 .2965 1.98 r
2
= .2304
Percent Non-Whtie 70 -.1260 .83
Percent H. S. Grads. 76 -.1168 .68
1974
Independent Variables Beta t
Per Capita Income 74 .4108 2.35
Percent Metro 76 .2262 1.45 r 2 .2841
Percent Non-White 70 -.0478 .33
Percent H.S. Grads. 74 -.0901 .55
1972
Independent Variables Beta t
Per Capita Income 72 .3910 1.90
Percent Metro 70 .1779 1.04 r
2
= .2462
Percent Non-White 70 -.0584 .31
Percent H. S. Grads. 70 -.0408 .27
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TABLE V
Direction & Duraition
Significant Residuals
State
Maine
Massachusets
New York
Rhode Island
California
Vermont
Michigan
Minnesota
Wisconsin
Sign of
1972
+
+
+
+
1
1972-1980
Deviation of Residual in
1974 1976 1978 1980 N
+ + + + 0
+ + + + 0
Hawaii
Aississippi
Oklahoma
Remaining States
Colarado
Kansas
South Carolina
Virginai
Connecticut
Delaware
North Dakota
Wyoming
Texas
0 0 +
0 0 0 0 +
+ 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0
Arizona
Florida
Indiana
Nevada
1A (+) indicates performance (spending) greater than one standard
deviation above what is predicted by the regression, while a (-)
indicates a deviaion greater than ono standard deviation below the
regression lint. A zero indicates performance within the predicted
range.
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+ 0 1
0
0
0
0
o
o
o
A Comparison of Theoretical*
TABLE VI
and Actual Distributions of Residuals
Sign in Four Time Periods
With A Consistent
Deviation from
Projection
Sign Frequency Probability
+ 5 .0000524
.0013763+ 4
+ 3 .0144507
+ 2 .0758661
+ 1 .1991485
n.a. 0 .4182119
- 1 
.1991485
- 2 
.0758661
- 3 
.0144507
- 4 
.0013763
- 5 .0000524
.9999999
*Theoretical frequency is calculated by using the
independence. For the details of this procedure
Expected Observed
Frequency Frequency
.00262 4
.06881 2
.72253 3
3.79331 1
9.95743 2
20.91060 25
9.95743 7
3.79331 1
.72253 1
.06881 0
.00262 4
49.9999 50
biomial theorem and assuming
contact the author.
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important lessons from inquiry into the welfare politics of these "good" and "bad"
states. Each reader can decide for himself whether consistently high or consis-
tently low spending is good or bad.
Conclusion:
The exercise provides strong presumptive evidence that state variations are
decidely non-random. The empirical portion of this paper clearly suggest a
resilient desire among the states to carry out their welfare programs consistent
with their own tradition. These differences persisted throughout a decade of
federalization of welfare programs. If, in the immediate future, the states are
"freed" from nationally imposed constraints, it is reasonable to assume that these
differences will intensify. For those concerned with national standards, this
will be an undersirable result. For those who focus on the opportunity for each
satate to chart it's own path, this result may be cheered. These attitudes
reflect the tension of a federal state welfare system. What is, however, clear
is that a retreat from federally imposed standards will most assuredly reintroduce
drastic interstate diversity in benefits, coverage and costs.
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NOTES
1 For a review of the complex political history of recent welfare reform efforts
it is instructive to read in serial form accounts of various efforts to change the
system. A careful summary of literature follows:
President's Johnson's Presidential Commission on Income Maintenance, (Heffernan,
W. Joseph, "The Failure of Welfare Reform: A Political Farce on Two Acts",
Institute Research on Poeverty, University of Wisconsin, Sept. 1973).
President Nixon's Family Assistance Plan, (Bowler, M. Kenneth). Nixon
Guaranteed Income Proposal Cambridge, Pollinger Publishing Company, 1974).
President Ford's Income Security Plan, (Lynn, Saureace E. Designing Public
Policy. Santa Monica, Goodyear Publishing Co. 1980, Ch. 5.)
President Carter's Program For Better Jobs and Income (Lynn, Saurence & David
DeF. Whitman. The President As Policy Worker. Philadelphia, Temple V. Press
1981.
2 The seminar paper in this field is Richard E. Dawson's and James E. Robinson's
"Inter-Party Competition, Economic Variables and Welfare Policy in the American
States," Journal of Politics, Vol. 25 (May, 1963), pp. 265-289. This literature
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has been significantly expanded and modified in the years since that publication
and has spawned an entire subfield of political science.
An incomplete yet incisive restatement of the development of the literature
is found in Thomas R. Dye's "Politics versus Economics: The Development of the
Literature on Policy Determination", Policy Studies Journal, Vol. 7 (Summer, 1979),
pp. 652-663. A more critical review along with very complete, but date, biblio-
graphical statement is found in Robert L. Savage's "The Literature of Systematic
Quantitative Comparison in American Stae Politics: An Assessment, Center for
the Study of Federalism, Center Report #11, Temple University, Philadelphia, 1976.
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